by Lyn M. Van Swol

Abstract
This article examined the premises of interpersonal deception theory (IDT) within
an advice-giving context. Advisors with quality and persuasion goals provided advice
concerning stock rankings to decision makers either primed or not primed to be suspicious
of advisors’ motives. Two competing hypotheses were proposed. First, suspicious decision
makers were predicted to accept less advice from all advisors and be no more likely to
detect advisors’ motives than nonsuspicious decision makers. Second, suspicious decision
makers were predicted to be better able to detect the motives of advisors and accept
less advice from the advisor with the persuasive motive than nonsuspicious decision
makers. The first hypothesis was supported. The persuasive advisor had significantly higher
confidence than the quality advisor on the rankings used to give advice, although not on
private rankings. Advisors’ confidence on these rankings fully mediated their influence on
the decision maker. (download)